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T RADITIONALLY, state law governs the internal operations of nonprofitorganizations. The influence of federal law is rooted in its role in
determining who will receive the highly enticing carrots of tax-exemption
and qualification to receive tax-deductible contributions.3 In recent
years, through various mechanisms, federal law has come to wield greater
influence.4 This move is not without controversy,s and this issue offers four
articles examining different aspects of this federalization of nonprofit law
and its consequences.
Benjamin Leff examines the impact of federal law on the complexion
of nonprofit boards, particularly their use of "independent" directors.' He
begins by reviewing IRS governance initiatives on director independence
to date, canvassing an array of statements by IRS officials lauding
independent directors, form changes requesting disclosures regarding board
composition and conflict of interest policies, and IRS training materials for
determination and examination specialists focusing on independence.' In
addition, Leff examines the IRS "in action," reviewing recent adverse IRS
determinations of eligibility for exemption that focus on board composition.8
He concludes that the IRS is after something different than state attorneys
I Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
2 See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 53-55, 377 (2004).
3 See I.R.C. § 50(c)(3) (zoo6) (setting for criteria for exemption from taxation for
"[clorporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, test-
ing for public safety, literary, . . . educational [or a few other similar] purposes"); see also id. §
170(c) (defining a very similar group of organizations as qualifying to receive tax-deductible
charitable contributions). The federalization of nonprofit law is not exclusively a recent trend
and has antecedents decades ago. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 377.
4 See James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, pt. IV (zolo); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson,
Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 479,48o-81 (20 10); Marcus Owens, Charities and Governance: Is the IRS Subject to Challenge?,
TAx ANALYSTS 2008-9664, at 1-4.
5 See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 4, at pt. V(C); Owens, supra note 4, at 7.
6 Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on
Third-Party Stakeholders as a "Middle Path," 99 Ky. L.J. 731 (zo I).
7 See id. at 736-43.
8 See id. at 754-59.
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general policing board independence to protect donors and the public from
abusive self-dealing transactions. The IRS is concerned when a board is
dominated by founders, for fear the organization will pursue private over
exempt purposes (whether or not those private purposes are financial).'
The determination letters Leff examines show the IRS does not refuse
exemption anytime an.organization lacks.an independent board; it denies
exemption when organizations without independent boards present a risk
that private interests would dominate and where the organization does not
have other empowered parties likely to counter that risk.'0
Leff argues this focus can be defended as appropriate to the IRS's role
in guarding exempt purposes and preventing exempt organizations from
pursuing private purposes." Importantly, he does not suggest the IRS has
persuasively made this argument, rather only that such an argument could
be used to support its actions." To make the IRS's board independence
inquiries defensible though, Leff believes a limiting principle is
required." He argues the IRS should only require independent boards for
organizations at risk to pursue private purposes, without meaningful third-
party stakeholders, and who will not be governed by the already restrictive
private foundation regime.14 Meaningful third-party stakeholders include
a class of individuals like donors, volunteers, and members, who have
"an interest in an organization's activities."" In organizations at risk for
pursuing private purposes, and without the additional regulation of the
private foundation regime, demanding independent board members enlists
them to serve as needed meaningful third-party stakeholders, incentivized
and empowered to combat this risk.'"
Finally, in Leff's view, if this limiting principle is applied, federal efforts
to regulate nonprofit board composition can be appropriately cabined to
their proper sphere." The lack of meaningful third-party stakeholders,
he argues, makes an organization a particular threat to federal interests
in maintaining the fisc because it means "the federal government has no
allies" to combat inappropriate self-dealing." Furthermore, he argues,
organizations without meaningful third-party stakeholders are unlikely to
arouse much attention from state regulators, responsive to whistleblowers,
9 See id. at 752-55, 764-65.
io See id. at 765.
ii See id. at 747.
I2 See id. at 765.
13 See id. at 747, 765.
14 See id. at 777.
15 Id. at 765-66.
16 See id. at 771.
17 See id. at 777-8o.
18 Id. at 779.
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disgruntled volunteers, and donors who feel duped. 9 Thus, Leff argues
his limiting principle may produce a division of labor beneficial to the
overall nonprofit regulatory environment. It offers a net gain by focusing
the energies of federal regulators on precisely those problematic nonprofits
overburdened or uninterested state attorneys general may fail to police.
Johnny Rex Buckles considers a different context where federal
regulation has made forays into the heartland of traditional state nonprofit
regulation, that of the duty of loyalty.2 0 He argues the duty of loyalty has
long been federalized in at least three ways: the application of the standard
organizational and operational tests for exemption, the private benefit
doctrine, and the prohibition on inurement.' The organizational and
operational tests for exemption require qualifying organizations to be formed
to pursue exempt purposes and to engage in exempt activities." Disqualifying
non-exempt purposes and activities include, prominently, loyalty breaches
like pursuing the personal gain for organizational fiduciaries or engaging in
activities that would enrich these fiduciaries at the expense of the exempt
entities. Likewise, he views the prohibitions on excessive private benefit
and on any inurement to insiders to condition an organization's eligibility
for exemption on being free from loyalty breaches."
In addition to loyalty requirements imposed by the fundamental
requirements for exemption, Buckles argues that federal excise taxes on
exempt nonprofits further. federalize loyalty.14 His extremely thorough
review of the excise tax regime, including those under I.R.C. § 4958 and
the private foundation, supporting organization, and donor-advised fund
rules, identifies three different federal loyalty standards." At times, the
excise tax regime requires fiduciaries of exempt organizations to meet
loyalty standards greater than that state loyalty requirements of either trust
or nonprofit corporate law would impose. He refers to these as "supra-
trustee standards." 6 In other situations, the federal standard imposed is
equivalent to either the trust law or the nonprofit corporate law standard."
Unfortunately, current law does not help us to discern why some
contexts require supra-trustee standards, while others merit more lenient
nonprofit corporate director-type treatment, and still others traditional
19 See id. at 778-79.
20 Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity
Fiduciaries Under United States Tax Law, 99 Ky. L.J. 645 (2011).
2I Id. at653.
22 See id. at 654-58.
23 Id. at 658-62.
24 Id. at 662.
25 Id. at 665-76.
26 Id. at 678-79.
27 Id. at 679-81.
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trust law standards." The standards imposing loyalty obligations vary by
organization and transaction involved, without a clear rationale." Thus,
Buckles decries the federal excise tax regime's duty of loyalty concept as
internally inconsistent, if not incoherent. Yet, he does not challenge the
strong interest of federal law enforcement of loyalty. His point is quite
the contrary. State enforcement in the nonprofit context is legendarily
inadequate.30 Revoking exemption for breaches of loyalty, even if possible
under the organizational and operational tests or private benefit and
inurement doctrines, is practically flawed." This ultimate sanction will
be imposed in the rarest of circumstances, and when it is, the victimized
organization, rather the disloyal fiduciary, will often be harmed."
In Buckles's view, federal law has important reasons to pursue loyalty
from exempt organization fiduciaries, but it must do so more thoughtfully
and consistently.33 Buckles argues that consistency might be achieved by
harmonizing the standards or by articulating cogent reasons for the differing
approaches, but achieving it is paramount.34 Although some elements
of a federalized duty of loyalty reinforce state fiduciary law, it can also
undermine state law remedies, by applying revenue-depleting excise taxes
and revoking exemptions. Therefore, he argues, reconciling the impacts
of a federalized duty of loyalty on state law remedies is also vital. 6
Nicole Dandridge reminds us that even clear and consistent federal
efforts to regulate nonprofits may differentially and detrimentally impact
smaller organizations." Her article examines new federal filing requirements
focused on improving governance and transparency, which Dandridge
argues will impose significant costs on small nonprofits without generating
corresponding benefits." The revised Form 1023 encourages all applicants
for exemption to adopt relatively stringent and procedurally complex
governance standards like conflict of interest policies, which she argues are
inappropriate for small and local community service organizations.39 The
new Form 990-N, despite its small size and limited information requests,
28 See id. at 686-87.
29 See id.
30 Seeid.at681-82.
31 See id. at 682.
32 See id.
33 See id. 693-94.
34 See id.
35 See id. 687-93.
36 See id. 693-94.
37 Nicole S. Dandridge, Choking Out Local Community Service Organizations: Recent Upsurge
in Federal Regulation Impacting Small Nonprofit Entities and Reasonable Enforcement, 99 Ky. L.J.
695(201I).
38 See id. 696.
39 See id 7o8-ii.
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puts these small nonprofits on an annual reporting schedule and penalizes
noncompliance with revocation of exemption.4 Once revoked, exemption
may only be regained through reapplication using the very form her analysis
harshly critiques, the new Form 1023.41
Dandridge reminds us of the heterogeneity of the nonprofit sector
and its ties to local communities, attributes that may be overlooked in the
desire to obtain the uniformity and resources of federal enforcement. She
argues the IRS should instead heed the lessons of "responsive regulation"
and "new governance." 42 Responsive regulation theory instructs regulators
to take seriously the context within which regulated entities operate and
proceed from "restorative" to more "punitive" enforcement efforts in
a stepwise fashion. 43 The new governance school of thought encourages
greater collaboration between regulators and the regulated industry,
championing careful attention to the context in which regulated entities
operate and the goals of the regulation.44
According to Dandridge, mass revocations for Form 990-N nonfilers skip
several steps along the responsive regulatory path, proceeding too quickly
to dire regulatory consequences for the small, unsophisticated entities
being regulated. 45 Before moving to revocation, she argues the IRS should
pursue greater efforts at education and training for nonprofit leaders, as well
as notice.46 Notice might helpfully be made more effective by obtaining
the assistance of state regulators. 47 Moreover, even when notice is to n6
avail, she argues exemptions should be revoked subject to reinstatement
on filing a proper Form 990-N, and should not require full reapplication
through the revised Form 1023 process. 48 If Congress and the IRS followed
the precepts of new governance and involved small nonprofits more in the
decision-making process leading to the Form 1023 and 990-N changes,
Dandridge suggests the same form revisions and non-filing remedies might
not have been put in place.49 Although the IRS did extend Form 990-N
filing deadlines in response to concerns that small nonprofits were unaware
or unable to meet the initial ones,"o Dandridge argues greater flexibility
was warranted.
40 See id. at 712-13. The Form 9 9o-N was promulgated to comply with demands for filing
by small nonprofits included in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. See id. at 711-12.
41 Id. at 713.
42 See id. at 721-22.
43 Id. at 723-24.
44 See id. at 724-25.
45 See id. at 725-26.
46 Id. at 725-28.
47 Id. at 727-28.
48 Id. at 725-26.
49 Id. at 724.
5o Id. at 719-20.
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In the final article, Mark Sidel considers the links between federalization
and another recent trend in nonprofit law: self-regulation." In fact,
Sidel frames his view of the federalization trend to include greater self-
regulation. 2 He notes, for example, an influential staff report of the Senate
Finance Committee in 2004 that recommended funds be authorized to
contract with accreditation organizations, which would serve as certifiers
of eligibility to obtain charitable exemption and receive deductible
contributions under federal tax law." Of course, this staff report and the
efforts of the Senate Finance Committee and its then-Chairman Senator
Charles Grassley spurred one of the most prominent and comprehensive
self-regulatory efforts in recent years, that of the Panel on the Nonprofit
Sector by Independent Sector," which was convened at Senator Grassley's
behest." It is beyond any doubt that the Panel's efforts occurred in the
shadow of possible federal regulation, had Senator Grassley and his
colleagues not been satisfied with its self-regulatory efforts.
At the moment, federal and self-regulatory efforts appear to recommend
similar best practices and have been thus far "mutually reinforcing."56
This will not necessarily always be the case. Sidel recognizes that federal
regulation and self-regulation can also be in tension and raises important
issues to monitor here." If federal regulation begins to make more demands
on exempt nonprofits, will self-regulatory efforts be displaced? Or, will
other, more complicated dynamics ensue if and when nopnrofits are forced
to respond to conflicting recommendations from these multiple sources of
regulation? What about conflicts between the demands of competing self-
regulators? In the U.S. nonprofit sector, these trends are in their early stages
and these questions cannot yet be answered.s8
Instead, Sidel offers insights drawn from the experience of other
51 Mark Sidel, The "Federalization" Problem and Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Some Initial
Thoughts, 99 Ky. L.J. 783 (2011).
52 See id. at 785.
53 Id. at 785-87.
54 Id. at 784.
55 Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Diana Aviv,
President and CEO, Independent Sector (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nonprof-
itpanel.org/about/SFCltr.pdf (requesting that Independent Sector "convene an indepen-
dent national panel on the non-profit sector to consider and recommend actions that will
strengthen good governance"); Letter from Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Independent
Sector, to Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., and Senator Max Baucus,
Ranking Member, Senate Fin. Comm., (Oct. i2,2004), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.
orglaboutlacceptancehtml.html (accepting the request to convene a panel and describing its
efforts to proceed).
56 Id. at 788.
57 See id. at 787-88.
58 See id. at 788.
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regulated industries domestically and of nonprofits abroad. 9 Canvassing
fields as diverse as securities and organic food certification, Sidel reviews
how federal agencies have delegated regulatory tasks like data-gathering
and compliance review to self-regulatory authorities, often but not always
retaining enforcement power in the agency itself.60 Looking beyond our
borders, Sidel relates the experience of self-regulation in the Philippines.
There, the government ultimately delegated responsibility for determining
eligibility for certain tax benefits to a self-regulatory body, the Philippine
Council for NGO Certification (PCNC).61 The PCNC, though, is not the
only active self-regulatory body for nonprofits in the Philippines. Other
self-regulatory bodies also function, offering codes of ethics and best
practices for particular subsectors.62 In addition to delegating government
regulatory authority to the PCNC (a process which has not been uniformly
smooth),63 Sidel reports that significant progress has been made toward
resolving conflicts amongst various self-regulators." Both experiences
can offer lessons for the U.S. nonprofit context. Managing conflicts among
standards set by multiple self-regulatory bodies or between self-regulatory
and government standards is a growing domestic problem. Sidel reports on
one state's efforts to harmonize thems and suggests these efforts will be
required more often going forward.
The relationship of state and federal nonprofit regulation evokes great
interest and creates significant tensions. On the one hand, federalization
may be a boon, adding enforcement resources that strapped state
regulators need to successfully regulate the nonprofit sector. On the other
hand, federalization could impinge on state authority, undermine state
regulation, nonprofit autonomy and viability, as well as valuable self-
regulation. It could also be executed in an inconsistent or destructive
fashion. The articles collected here offer us valuable insights and critiques
of this dynamic process as it moves toward an uncertain future.
59 Id. at 788-97.
6o See id. at 788-91.
61 Id. at 791-96.
62 Id. at 794-95.
63 See id. at 795.
64 See id. at 794-96.
65 Id. at 796-97.
2010- 20111] 643

